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P
erhaps there is no other economic debate older than that over inequality. While 
most people agree that some reduction of inequality is desirable, there is no 
consensus over what is meant by equality, nor over what should be equalized (see 
Amartya Sen 1980; Ronald Dworkin 1981a, 1981b; Henry Phelps Brown 1988; John 
E. Roemer 1996; and many others). For many economists, the second fundamental 
welfare theorem separates distributional issues from the analysis of efficiency. As 
a result, the bulk of the current literature on inequality concentrates either on the 
measurement of inequality, or on the fairness of particular resource distributions.
Here, we address the issue of inequality from a purely economic perspective. We 
assume a society in which individuals differ in terms of initial endowments, whether it 
is innate ability, education acquired or inherited wealth, and where these endowments 
are private information. Further, the rewards that individuals receive as a result of their 
performance are assigned by a tournament. A fixed set of rewards, that could represent 
cash prizes, places at a prestigious university, attractive jobs, desirable spouses, social 
esteem, monopoly rents or any combination of these, vary in terms of their desirabil-
ity. Individuals make a simultaneous decision about how to divide their endowments 
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Which Inequality? 
The Inequality of Endowments versus the Inequality
of Rewards
†
By Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko*
We introduce a new distinction between inequality in initial endow-
ments (e.g., ability, inherited wealth) and inequality of what one can 
obtain as rewards (e.g., prestigious positions, money). We show that, 
when society allocates resources via tournaments, these two types 
of  inequality  have  opposing  effects  on  equilibrium  behavior  and 
well-being. Greater inequality of rewards hurts most people—both 
the middle class and the poor—who are forced into greater effort. 
Conversely, greater inequality of endowments benefits the middle 
class. Thus, the correctness of our intuitions about the implications 
of inequality is hugely affected by the type of inequality considered. 
(JEL D63, D82)
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between performance in the tournament and private consumption or leisure. Then each 
individual is given a reward according to his rank in the distribution of performance. 
First prize is given to first place, second prize to second place, and so on.
Such a tournament creates important positional externalities, as to obtain a top 
reward one must occupy a top position, and by doing so one excludes others from 
that position and hence that reward. As observed by Harold L. Cole, George J. 
Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite (1992) (see also Postlewaite 1998), this induces 
competitors to behave as though they had a desire for high relative position, such 
as in Robert H. Frank’s (1985) classic model of status. In turn, this leads to equilib-
rium effort being inefficiently high and equilibrium utility being inefficiently low. 
Crucially, these externalities also imply that the equilibrium choice of effort and 
equilibrium utility depend on both the initial distribution of endowments and the 
distribution of rewards. Therefore, there is no need to appeal to any notion of justice 
for inequality to matter. It matters because what others have affects the job one gets, 
the wage one is paid, and the amount of leisure one takes.
In particular, the shape and the range of the distributions of endowments and 
rewards themselves determine the marginal return to effort. Thus, changes in the level 
of inequality of either distribution can affect the equilibrium behavior and utility even 
of those individuals who see neither a change in their own endowment nor in reward. 
Further, we find that changes in the inequality of endowments have the opposite effect 
to changes in the inequality of rewards. A decrease in the inequality of competitors’ 
endowments raises the return to effort as it is easier to overtake one’s rivals. This leads 
to higher effort for low-and middle-ranking agents. Furthermore, equilibrium utility 
falls at middle and high ranks and even those with higher endowments can be worse 
off in the less unequal and hence more competitive distribution. However, a decrease 
in the inequality of rewards implies there is less difference between a high prize and 
a low one. This leads to a reduction in incentives and a decrease in equilibrium effort 
for low- and middle-ranking competitors, and an increase in their equilibrium utility. 
Indeed, under some conditions, even stronger welfare effects are possible–namely 
that reduced inequality of rewards can make all better off.
Simply put, in the tournament model we consider, a reduction in inequality of 
rewards can benefit most of society, but lower inequality of endowments can harm 
the majority. Thus, the inequality of rewards has a much better fit with our intuition 
about the effects of inequality than the inequality of endowments.
In such a model, even policy interventions such as lump-sum taxes and transfers 
will have an impact on incentives as they change either the distribution of endow-
ments or of rewards. In fact, there are two distinct effects from any changes in the 
level of inequality. The first, which we call the direct effect, is simply that under a 
less unequal distribution of endowments or rewards lower ranked individuals will 
have greater endowments or rewards, respectively. However, in either case, there is 
also the second effect, which we call the incentive or social competitiveness effect. 
Crucially, the incentive effect of a decrease in inequality of endowments is positive 
and opposite of that of a decrease in the inequality of rewards, which decreases 
incentives. This incentive effect is created by the competitive externalities present in 
our tournament model. So, in their absence, such as in more conventional neoclassi-
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would appear to have similar results. This is possibly why the distinction between 
rewards and endowments has not been made before.
We further contribute to the modelling of inequality by demonstrating the impor-
tance of the method of tracking individuals when endowments change. There are two 
ways of doing this: compare choices and outcomes at a given level of endowment 
or at a given rank in the distribution of endowments. As Hopkins and Kornienko 
(2009) point out, and as we show here, the two methods of indexing lead to seem-
ingly contradictory results. Lower inequality of endowments leads to higher utility 
at a given low rank, but lower utility at a given low endowment. However, since in 
a less unequal distribution low-ranked individuals tend to have higher endowments, 
these are simply two different ways of looking at the same results.
In summary, our contribution is five-fold. First, we show that, in the tournament 
model we consider here, inequality can have a direct impact on material outcomes, 
and thus can be examined using positive methods of economic analysis. Second, we 
identify two different types of inequality, and examine them within the same model. 
Third, by employing novel techniques, we show that the two types of inequality 
often have opposite effects on material outcomes. Fourth, we contrast the results 
obtained using two different indexing methods. Finally, we argue that tournament 
models help us to understand different types of social inequality and, thus, help to 
answer the normative question ‘which inequality should we care about?’
I.  Related Literature
Why should we assume that rewards are determined by tournaments rather than 
by competitive markets? An important reason is empirical. Tournament-like mecha-
nisms are used in practice to determine university admissions, entry into certain 
professions, and promotions and pay within firms. Second, relative position seems 
to matter for welfare. There is now a significant body of research that suggests that 
indicators of well-being, such as job satisfaction (Gordon D. A. Brown et al. 2008), 
health (M. G. Marmot et al. 1991; Marmot 2004) and overall happiness (Richard 
A. Easterlin 1974), are strongly determined by relative position. That is, a highly 
ranked individual in a poor country can have greater health and happiness than a 
low-ranked individual in a richer country, even though the latter has greater material 
prosperity. There are two leading hypotheses to explain these empirical findings. 
The first, pioneered in modern economics by James S. Duesenberry (1949) and 
Frank (1985), is that people have an intrinsic concern for relative position or sta-
tus. The second hypothesis is due to the fundamental insight of Cole, Mailath and 
Postlewaite (1992) that many of life’s crucial rewards are allocated by tournament-
like mechanisms, and this induces the appearance of preference for status.
By analyzing a tournament model, clearly we favor the second rationale for why 
welfare depends on relative position. Yet, equally, our present analysis of the effects 
of inequality also would be applicable to a model of intrinsic relative concerns. 
Broadly consistent with our current results, Gary S. Becker, Kevin M. Murphy and 
Ivan Werning (2005) find that, in a model of status, agents would willingly take lotter-
ies that would increase what we would call the inequality of endowments. Inequality 
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2009). The crucial difference is that here we also consider the inequality of rewards, 
as well as employing a more general specification when considering endowments. 
Thus, our results concerning the effects of changes in the level of inequality of 
endowments are generalizations of those in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2009). 
However, the results on the inequality of rewards, and the idea of contrasting them 
with the results on inequality of endowments, which we see as the main contribution 
of the current paper, are entirely novel.
The literature on tournaments and contests is extensive. As Kai A. Konrad (2009) 
points out in a survey, increased heterogeneity among competitors and decreased 
spread of prizes are both known to reduce equilibrium effort.
1 The technical contri-
bution here is to consider very general comparative statics for large populations of 
competitors. The use of rank-order tournament models to study nonmarket allocation 
of resources was pioneered by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 1995, 1998), 
followed by Unal Zenginobuz (1996) and Raquel Fernandez and Jordi Gali (1999). 
However, their focus of interest is not inequality, but a comparison of different institu-
tions for assigning rewards. Two other papers are technically particularly close to our 
work, yet they also look at different issues. Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela (2006) 
consider what would be the optimal contest design from the perspective of a contest 
designer who aimed to maximize either the expected total effort or the expected high-
est effort from contestants. Heidrun C. Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) generalize 
this approach to a two-sided matching tournament problem.
One important assumption of our tournament model is that there is a fixed dis-
tribution of indivisible rewards. The justification for this is that in reality there are 
many desirable things, jobs, places at university, marriage opportunities, that do 
differ in quality and are not divisible. A subtle criticism is that even if rewards are 
indivisible, they might be assigned by prices rather than performance, which might 
improve efficiency. This possibility is analyzed in a different literature where work-
ers are matched to (indivisible) jobs by an endogenous wage schedule. For example, 
Robert M. Costrell and Glenn C. Loury (2004) and Wing Suen (2007) have consid-
ered changes in the distribution of ability of workers and in the quality of jobs. There 
is no incentive effect as there is no choice of effort by workers and all outcomes 
are Pareto efficient, in distinct contrast to the situation we model. Nonetheless, the 
shape of the distributions of ability and of jobs affects the distribution of wages. 
That is, changes in the level of inequality can have a material effect on outcomes 
even if there is a price mechanism.
2
We also argue that our distinction between endowments and rewards to be novel 
in that it differs from the most common existing concepts of equality on three levels. 
First, we argue that equality of rewards and endowments are logically separate from 
equality of opportunity. Here, as rewards are determined solely by performance, 
agents always face equality of opportunity, yet the levels of reward and endowment 
1 Much of this literature concentrates on games in which the mechanism that awards prizes is assumed to be 
at least partly stochastic. What we model here in a contrast could be called a perfectly discriminating rank order 
tournament or contest.
2 More technically, inequality of endowments and inequality of rewards will have opposing effects regardless 
of whether matching between competitors and jobs or rewards is done under transferable utility or nontransferable 
utility. See Hopkins (2005) for a comparison of the two cases.110  AMERICAN ECoNoMIC JoURNAL: MICRoECoNoMICS  AUGUST 2010
equality vary.
3 Existing merit-, desert-, or effort-based theories of justice assume 
that those who work more, or have greater merit, should have greater rewards (see 
James Konow (2003) for a survey), however, there seems to be little discussion 
of the fact that the reward schedule could vary even in the presence of equality of 
opportunity. Talent could vary widely, but the most talented could receive a mon-
etary reward only slightly greater than the least talented. Alternatively, small differ-
ences in talent could lead to big differences in outcomes. Second, in the distributive 
justice literature (see John Rawls (1971), Dworkin (1981b), Roemer (1996, 1998) 
among others), one often encounters the question of equality of “resources” (wealth, 
but also possibly education or talent). However, these works make no distinction 
about timing or causation, in the sense that there is no distinction made between 
what one has initially (endowment) and what one is able to obtain (reward). Third, 
equality of rewards should not be confused with equality of welfare or equality of 
outcomes. In this model at least, the welfare of an individual depends jointly on a set 
of outcomes that includes her endowment, her choice of effort as well as her reward.
II.  The Model
In this section, we develop our model, where a large population competes in a tour-
nament-like market to obtain rewards or prizes. We have in mind three prime examples. 
The first is students competing for places at college. The second is a market for jobs. 
For example, students in the final year of graduate school seek faculty positions at 
universities. The third is a marriage market, where singles attempt to attract desirable 
potential spouses. These three situations are modelled as tournaments by Fernández 
and Galí (1999); Hopkins (2005); and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992), respec-
tively. We will use the terminology of “contestants” competing for rewards. Contestants 
have to make a decision on how to allocate their initial endowment between private 
consumption and visible performance that acts as a signal of underlying ability. Each 
contestant is then awarded a reward or prize. These are awarded assortatively with the 
best performer being awarded the top prize, the median performer the median prize 
and so on downward with the worst performer receiving the last prize.
We assume a continuum of contestants. They are differentiated in quality with 
contestants  having  differing  endowments  z  with  endowments  being  allocated 
according to the publicly known distribution G(z) on [	 	 _	 z  ,  
_
	 z    	 ] with   _  z   ≥ 0. The level of 
each contestant’s endowment is her private information. The distribution G(z) is twice 
differentiable with strictly positive density g(z). A contestant’s level of endowment z 
has possible interpretations such as her wealth or an ability parameter that determines 
maximum potential performance.
4 In particular, contestants must divide their endow-
ments between visible performance x and private consumption or leisure y.
3 The equality of opportunity we consider here is nondiscriminatory, or “formal” in the sense of Roemer (1996, 
163), and “competitive” in the sense of D. A. Lloyd Thomas (1977) and S. J. D. Green (1989). We discuss the 
relation of our work to previous literature on equality in greater detail in the working paper version of this paper.
4 For example, suppose all contestants are endowed with the same amount of time that can be used for produc-
tion or leisure. Then, let z be productivity per hour and a contestant devoting a proportion x/z of time to production 
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There is also a continuum of prizes or rewards of value s whose publicly known 
distribution has the twice differentiable distribution function H(s) on [	 	 _	 s  ,  
_
	 s    	 ] and 
strictly positive density h(s). While the rewards could simply be in cash, this is not 
necessarily the case. In the context of the academic job market, s could be inter-
preted as prestige or reputation of a university, in the marriage market, s could be a 
measure of attractiveness to the opposite sex. After the contestants’ choice of perfor-
mance, rewards will be awarded assortatively, so that the contestant with the highest 
performance x will gain the prize with highest value   
_
	 s    	 . More generally, the rank of 
the prize awarded will be equal to a contestant’s rank in terms of performance.
We have two ideas in mind why rewards might be assigned in such a way. First, 
such mechanisms are often used in situations such as college admissions to pro-
mote a form of equality of opportunity. For example, if z represents ability and x 
represents academic performance, then the highest rewards go to contestants with 
the highest performance which in the equilibrium we consider will be those of high-
est ability.
5 Second, the other side of the market could consist of people, potential 
spouses, or employers, rather than inanimate prizes. These potential partners would 
have to choose between contestants. But it is easy enough to specify suitable prefer-
ences for the partners such that the end result in equilibrium would be the same; the 
best performing contestant obtains the best match.
6 Here, we assume that such part-
ners are interested in a contestant’s performance x mostly in terms of what it signals 
about his underlying endowment of ability z.
A contestant’s endowment z can be employed in performance x or private con-
sumption y = z − x (that is, the rate of conversion between x and y is normalized to 
one). All contestants have the same utility function
(1)    U(x, y, s)  =  U(x, z  −  x, s).
We assume that utility is increasing in all three arguments, performance x, private 
consumption y, and the reward s. That is, there is some private benefit to perfor-
mance, for example, private satisfaction from studying.
7 While it is possible to 
divide one’s endowment between x and y, the only way to obtain a reward s is to 
take part in the tournament.
We assume a series of standard conditions on the utility function that will enable 
us to derive a monotone equilibrium and clear comparative statics results: (i) U is 
twice continuously differentiable (smoothness); (ii) Ux(x, y, s)	>	0, Uy(x, y, s)	>	0,
Us(x, y, s)	>	0 (monotonicity); (iii) Uxy(x, y, s)	>	0, Uys(x, y, s) ≥ 0 and Uxs(x, y, s) 
≥  0  (complementarity);  (iv)  Uii(x, y, s)	 ≤	 0  for  i  =  x, y, s  (own  concavity); 
(v) Ux(x, z −	x, s)	−	Uy(x, z −	x, s) = 0 has a unique solution x = γ	 (z, s) and whenever x 
≥ γ	 (z, s) it holds that Uxs(x, z −	x, s)	−	Uys(x, z −	x, s)	≤	0. 
5 Fernández and Galí (1999) show that such mechanisms can be more efficient than markets in assigning edu-
cational opportunities when capital markets are imperfect.
6 See Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (1992, 1998) for explicit consideration of voluntary matching between 
contestants and potential partners.
7 Nothing substantial depends on this assumption. All results are qualitatively the same if x has no intrinsic value 
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This last condition seems somewhat complicated, but it is automatically satisfied if 
utility is additively or multiplicatively separable in s. Note also that it implies a com-
petitor would choose a positive performance x even when there are no competitive 
pressures.
It is natural, perhaps, to think of a competitor’s type as her level of endowment. 
However, given an endowment distribution G(z), an agent with endowment    ˜     z     has 
rank    ˜     r     = G(	 	˜     z    ), and it is just as valid to think of her type as being    ˜     r     as much as it is    ˜     z     
(recall that we assumed that G(·) is strictly increasing on its support so that there is 
a one-to-one relation between endowment and rank). There are several advantages 
of indexing by rank over indexing by endowment level as discussed in detail in 
Hopkins and Kornienko (2009) and in Section III here. Nonetheless, we will use 
both methods, with indexing by level of endowment to be found in Section V. In this 
section, we will treat each competitor’s type as her rank r. Notice that an agent’s 
endowment can be expressed as a function of her rank or    ˜     z     = G
−1(	 	˜     r    ) (i.e.,    ˜     z     is at 
the    ˜     r    -quantile). In particular, let us write Z(r) = G
−1(r). Thus, her strategy will be a 
mapping x(r)	:	[0, 1]	→ 핉+	from rank to performance.
Then, a symmetric equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium in which all contes-
tants use the same strategy, that is, the same mapping x(r) from rank in endowments 
to performance. Suppose for the moment that all contestants adopt such a strategy 
x(r) that, furthermore, is differentiable and strictly increasing (we will go on to show 
that such an equilibrium exists). Let us aggregate all the performance decisions of 
the contestants into a distribution function F(x). If x(r) is strictly increasing, then 
there will be no mass points in the distribution of performance, so that F(x) is con-
tinuous and strictly increasing. Note that when all contestants follow such a strategy, 
the outcome would be fully separating. One can deduce a contestant’s endowments 
z or his rank in the distribution of endowments r from his choice of performance x.
We assume that formal equality of opportunity holds, so that rewards are assigned 
to contestants solely on the basis of an agent’s visible performance, x.
8 In contrast, 
inequality of opportunity would be exhibited by a rule whereby the allocation of 
rewards depended on some further, extraneous factor such as race, age, gender, or 
social status.
9
Given that rewards are indivisible and are ranked from lowest to highest, the 
obvious way to assign rewards in a way that would satisfy equality of opportunity is 
assortatively. Rewards are assigned on the basis of one’s rank F(x) in performance 
with the highest performance obtaining the highest reward and so on. This assign-
ment should also be measure-preserving (the equivalent, given a continuum of 
prizes and contestants, of awarding exactly one prize to each contestant). A possible 
way to do this is to assign rewards assortatively so that rank in rewards equals rank 
in endowments, or H(s) = G(z). Note that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium, where 
the strategy x(r) is strictly increasing in an agent’s rank, we have that G(z) = F(x) 
8 Roemer (1996, 163) defines formal equality of opportunity as “there is no legal bar to access to education, to 
all positions and jobs, and that all hiring is meritocratic.”
9 Andrew Schotter and Keith Weigelt (1992) consider the effect of inequality of opportunity in stochastic con-
tests with two contestants and find that both theoretically and experimentally that it reduces effort. Similar analysis 
within our model would call for more advanced methods as inequality of opportunities here would imply an addi-
tional dimension of inequality among agents, and thus we leave such analysis for future research.VoL. 2 No. 3  113 HoPKINS AND KoRNIENKo: WHICH INEQUALITY?
= r. That is, an agent’s rank r in the distribution of endowments G(z) is equal to her 
rank in the distribution of performance. In turn, if rewards are assigned assortatively 
according to performance, so that an agent’s rank in the distribution of performance 
F(x) is equal to her rank in the distribution of rewards H(s), so that G(z) = F(x) = 
H(s) = r, then we have an assignment that satisfies equality of opportunity and is 
measure preserving.
REMARK 1: Equality of opportunity implies that rewards are assigned assorta-
tively based on a competitor’s performance x so that the rank of the reward H(s) is 
equal to his/her rank in the distribution of performance F(x). In a fully separating 
equilibrium, this is equal to his/her rank in endowments so that
(2)    G(z)  =  F(x)  =  H(s)  =  r.
That implies that, in such an equilibrium, an agent of rank r is allocated a reward 
s = H
−1(r).
Note that this relationship (2) implies that we can define the function
(3)    S(r) = H
−1(r),
which gives the equilibrium reward of a contestant of type r, so that S : [0, 1]	→	
[   _  s  ,  
_
	 s    	 ]. The marginal increase in reward from an increase in one’s rank would be
    S′(r)  =      1  _	
h(H
−1(r))
		   =      1  _	
h(S(r))
		 .
This also implies a reduced form utility:
    U(x, y, s)  =  U(x(r), Z(r)	−	x(r), S(r)).
That is, the tournament with assortative award of prizes implies that each individu-
al’s payoffs are increasing in her rank r in the distribution of contestants. It therefore 
might appear to an outside observer that the individual had some form of social 
preferences where she cares about her relative position, similar to those analyzed by 
Frank (1985) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004). As Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 
(1992), and Postlewaite (1998) point out, this form of tournament therefore gives a 
strategic basis to such models.
Continuing with the assumption that all agents adopt the same increasing, dif-
ferentiable strategy x(r), let us see whether any individual agent has an incentive to 
deviate. Suppose that instead of following the strategy followed by the others, an 
agent with rank r chooses xi = x(	 	˜     r    ), that is, she chooses performance as though she 
had rank    ˜     r    . Note that her utility would be equal to
    U  =  U(x(	 	˜     r    ), Z(r)	−	x(	 	˜     r    ), S(	 	˜     r    )).114  AMERICAN ECoNoMIC JoURNAL: MICRoECoNoMICS  AUGUST 2010
We differentiate this with respect to    ˜     r    . Then, given that in a symmetric equilib-
rium, the agent uses the equilibrium strategy, and so    ˜     r     = r. This gives the first-order 
condition
(4)    x′(r)(Ux(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(r))	−	Uy(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(r))) 
	 +  Us(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(r))S′(r)  =  0.
This first-order condition balances disutility from increasing effort x against the 
implied marginal benefit in terms of an increased reward from doing so. It defines a 
differential equation,
(5)  x′(r)  =     
Us(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(r))
	 	 	 ____	 	 	 	 	
Uy(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(r))	−	Ux(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(r))
		 	 S′(r) 
  =  ϕ(x, Z(r), S(r))S′(r).
An important point to recognize is that this differential equation and the equilib-
rium strategy, which is its solution, both depend on the distribution of endowments 
through Z(r) = G
−1(r) and the distribution of rewards through S(r) = H
−1(r).
Our next step is to specify what Frank (1985) and Hopkins and Kornienko (2004) 
call the “cooperative choice,” which is the optimal consumption choice (xc(r), yc(r)) 
when an individual cannot affect her reward. Specifically, assume that an agent of 
rank r is simply assigned a reward S(r) rather than having to compete for it. Her 
optimal choice in these circumstances must satisfy the standard marginal condition
(6)    Ux(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(r))	−	Uy(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(r)) = 0.
By assumption (v) on contestants’ preferences, there is a solution xc(r) = γ	 (Z(r), S(r)) 
to this maximization problem. The cooperative strategy also enables us to fix the 
appropriate boundary condition for the differential equation (5). Thus, the initial 
condition, or the choice of the individual with the lowest rank zero is
(7)    x(0)  =  xc(0).
We can now show the following existence result. It shows that there is only one fully 
separating equilibrium. Specifically, if all contestants adopt the strategy x(r) that is 
the solution to the above differential equation (5) with boundary condition (7), and 
rewards are awarded assortatively according to the rule (2), then no contestant has 
an incentive to deviate. Further, as this solution x(r) is necessarily strictly increasing, 
it is fully separating with contestants with high endowments producing a high level 
of performance. Thus, an authority organizing the tournament to promote equality of 
opportunity would be rational to give high rewards to high performers as high per-
formance signifies high ability. Or, in the matching story, potential partners should 
prefer to match with high performers. Note, however, this will typically not be the 
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equilibria will exist. In this paper, we concentrate on the separating equilibrium as this 
seems the most natural for the settings we consider. We now present our result.
PROPOSITION 1: The differential equation (5) with boundary conditions (7) has a 
unique solution which is the only symmetric separating equilibrium of the tourna-
ment. Equilibrium performance x(r) is greater than cooperative amount, that is x(r)	
>	xc(r) on (0, 1].
This implies that the cooperative outcome xc(r) Pareto dominates the equilibrium 
performance x(r) from the point of view of the contestants. As is common in com-
petitive situations, the contestants could make themselves all better off by agreeing 
to work less. How much more will depend on the exact form of the equilibrium 
strategy x(r), which, in turn, depends on the distribution of endowments and the dis-
tribution of rewards. We will go on to look at how equilibrium choices and welfare 
change in response to changes in these distributions.
Note that this welfare result holds even though contestants derive utility from 
their own performance, that is, it is not a pure signal. However, if other parties, for 
example, partners or employers, also benefit from the competitors’ efforts, overall 
welfare judgements are potentially more complicated. Hopkins (2005) looks at this 
issue and finds that, in the presence of incomplete information, the level of perfor-
mance can be excessive even considering the welfare of employers. However, it is 
clearly true that if contestants’ performance is sufficiently valuable to society, then 
the equilibrium performance level could be excessively low relative to the social 
optimum even if it is too high from their own perspective. Another possibility is that, 
like in Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite’s (1992) original tournament model, the ben-
eficiaries are the next generation. In this case, social competition leads to a growth 
rate that is higher than the present generation would choose (see also Giacomo 
Corneo and Olivier Jeanne 1997).
III.  Two Effects of Changes in Inequality
In this section, we introduce the intuition behind our analysis of how changes in 
either the distribution of endowments or in the distribution of rewards affect indi-
viduals in rank-based tournaments. We make the point that in both cases a change 
influences individual welfare through two channels: a direct effect and an incentive 
effect. It is the second effect which is central to our tournament model in that here, 
in contrast to standard models, changes in the endowment or rewards of others will 
change the incentives of individuals to engage in effort. But even the direct effect 
is not straightforward as it can be positive or negative depending on whether it is 
viewed from a position of a constant endowment or from a constant rank. These 
differing effects we now try to make clear in a simple way before moving to formal 
results in the next section.
Consider first a situation where individuals differ in their natural endowments, such 
as talent, ability, physical attractiveness, and so on. Then, while the distribution of 
endowments may change, through immigration for example, the endowment of an 
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the rank of such an individual will change even if her endowment does not. In such 
case, it makes sense to fix an individual by the level of her endowment z, and consider 
what happens as her rank r changes in response to changes in the distribution.
Consider,  instead,  a  situation  where  individual  endowments  are  in  terms  of 
income, wealth, capital goods, and so on. In this case, an individual’s endowment 
is not intrinsic and could be changed. For example, a redistributive tax policy could 
change the endowments of most (if not all) individuals. In such situations, it makes 
sense to fix an individual by her rank in the distribution of endowments r, but allow 
for her endowment z to change as the distribution of endowments varies.
10 In essence, 
this is exactly what policy analysts typically do by analyzing the consequences of 
redistributive policies for people occupying different ranks—for example, for the 
median individual or for lower and upper quartiles.
The distinction between rank-indexing and level-indexing is very important for the 
understanding of the effects of changes in inequality. Not only do the two indexing 
methods require different comparative statics methods, they also differ in how change 
in inequality is channeled into individual choices and well-being, as we will now see.
11
In what follows, we assume that there is a change in either the distributions of 
endowments or in the distributions of rewards, but not both. That is, we do not 
change both distributions at once. We label the initial distribution a for ex ante and 
the changed distribution p for ex post. We will consider two regimes. In regime 
G, we assume that there is no change in the distribution of rewards Ha = Hp = H, 
but there is a change in the distribution of endowments Ga	≠ Gp. In regime H, we 
assume that there is no change in the distribution of endowments, that is Ga = Gp 
= G, but the distribution of rewards changes, i.e., Ha 	≠	 Hp.
We go on to show how, given equality of opportunity, changes in the inequality of 
endowments and rewards affect different individuals. We distinguish between two 
different consequences of changes in the level of inequality, which we call the direct 
effect and the incentive effect.
A. The Direct Effect
The direct effect is what one would obtain under classical assumptions and it sim-
ply arises because changes in the social or economic environment of an individual 
have direct consequences on that individual’s choices and well-being, as they will 
change her endowment z, or her rank r, and/or her reward s. These direct conse-
quences will vary with the indexing method.
To understand the direct effect, suppose rewards were assigned noncompetitively 
by a social planner according to one’s rank in the endowment distribution, i.e., H(s) 
= G(z), leading to the “cooperative” choices as set out in Section II. Notice first that 
different endowment distributions imply that almost all individuals with fixed rank 
r have different endowments in the two societies, i.e., Za =   G    a   
−1  (r)	≠		 G    p   
−1  (r) = Zp, 
10 When interventions are rank-preserving (such as with a proportional tax), analysis at a fixed rank is equivalent 
doing analysis for a given individual before and after the change.
11 The same issues arise in assignment models. For example, Costrell and Loury (2004) use what we call rank 
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even though their equilibrium reward S = H
−1(r) does not change (see Figure 1). In 
contrast, almost all individuals with fixed endowment z have different ranks in the 
two societies, i.e., ra = Ga(z)	≠	Gp(z) = rp, and thus different equilibrium rewards 
Sa = H
−1(Ga(z))	≠	H
−1(Gp(z)) = Sp (see Figure 2).
An easy way to understand the differences between the two methods of index-
ing is to compare Figures 1 and 2, which show similar changes in the distribution 
of endowments. In both cases, the ex post distribution Gp is less unequal than the 
original distribution Ga. As illustrated in Figure 2, for a fixed level of endowment z1, 
in the less unequal distribution of endowments a low-ranked agent will have a lower 
reward. That is, the direct effect of redistribution is negative for low-ranked agents 
under indexing by endowment levels. However, in Figure 1, it is shown that for a 
fixed rank r1 a low-ranked agent will have the same reward, but a higher level of 
endowments in a less unequal distribution of rewards, the direct effect of redistribu-
tion for the low ranked is positive. Comparisons at a fixed level of endowment or at 
a fixed rank give a very different view of the same phenomenon.
In contrast, when we change the distribution of rewards, the direct effect does 
not depend on whether we index by rank or by level. The effect of redistribution of 
rewards will be positive for the low ranked. For example, see Figure 3, where now 
the ex post distribution of rewards Hp is less unequal than the ex ante distribution 
Ha(s). We have Sa =   H    a   
−1  (r1) =   H    a   
−1  (G(z1)) <   H    p   
−1  (r1) =   H    p   
−1  (G(z1)) = Sp. One can 
also see that it will be negative for the high ranked.
REMARK 2: The direct effect of lower inequality can be summarized as follows.
  (i)  Consider  first  rank-indexing.  Suppose  endowments  become  less  unequal, 
then, in equilibrium, low- (high-) ranking agents have higher (lower) endow-
ments. Suppose, instead, rewards become less unequal, then, in equilibrium, 
low- (high-) ranking agents have higher (lower) rewards.
  (ii)	 Consider now level-indexing. Suppose endowments become less unequal, 
then,  in  equilibrium,  low-  (high-)  ranking  agents  have  lower  (higher) 
rewards. Suppose, instead, rewards become less unequal, then, in equilib-
rium, low- (high-) ranking agents, have higher (lower) rewards.
Importantly, under rank indexing, the inequality of rewards and endowments 
appear to have qualitatively similar patterns of benefits and losses when one looks 
only at the direct (or classical, noncompetitive) effect, which may explain why 
reward and endowment inequality have not been distinguished before. Though, note 
that under level indexing, the direct effect of lower inequality of endowments is 
opposite to that of lower inequality of rewards.
B. The Incentive Effect
Now let us turn to the incentive (or marginal, positional, strategic, or social compet-
itiveness) effect of changes in inequality. Importantly, the effect of lower dispersion 
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  indexing method used. The incentive effect is the result of agents’ strategic interac-
tions. As was shown in Hopkins and Kornienko (2004, 2009), in the noncooperative 
game where agent’s rank matters for her welfare, the “social density,” or “social 
endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
Za(r1) Zp(r1) s _
s
H(s) 1
S(r1)
r1
ˆ r
Ga
Gp
ex ante
ex post
Figure 1
Notes: The direct effect in Regime G, under rank-indexing, a contestant with low rank r1 has a higher endowment 
Zp(r1) under the less unequal distribution of endowments Gp than the endowment Za(r1) under the more unequal dis-
tribution of endowments Ga, and in both cases has a reward S(r1).
endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
z ˆ z z1
H(s) 1
Sa(z 1) Sp(z1)
Gp Ga
z
ex ante
ex post
Figure 2
Notes: The direct effect in Regime G, under level-indexing,  a contestant with fixed low endowment z1 has a reward 
Sp(z1) under the less unequal distribution of endowments Gp that is worse than the reward Sa(z1) under the more 
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competitiveness,”  is  important  as  it  changes  incentives. The  incentive  effect  of 
changes in distributions on individual choices and welfare will depend largely on 
the densities of endowments and rewards, g(z) and h(s). This incentive effect can be 
modelled using the dispersion order (presented in Appendix A) which is a stochastic 
order used to compare distributions in terms of their densities.
REMARK 3: The incentive effect of lower inequality can be summarized as follows. 
	 (i)  Suppose endowments become less dispersed, then there is an increase in the 
marginal return to effort, as it is now easier to surpass neighbors, so that 
agents tend to increase their effort. 
	 (ii)  Suppose rewards become less dispersed, then there is a decrease in the mar-
ginal return to effort as rewards are now more similar, so that agents tend to 
increase their effort.
To find the total effect, which includes both direct and incentive effects, one needs 
to analyze how changes in inequality affect behavior, which we turn to now.
IV.  Effects of Changing Inequality under Indexing by Rank
We will now consider the effect on equilibrium utility and strategies of changes in 
the distribution of endowments G(z) and changes in the distribution of rewards H(s). In 
this section, we do this by comparing behavior before and after the change at each rank 
Figure 3
Notes: The direct effect in Regime H, under rank- and level-indexing, a contestant with low rank r1 has higher 
reward Sp(r1) under the less unequal distribution of rewards Hp than reward Sa(r1) under the more unequal distribu-
tion of rewards Sa.
endowments: z
rank
rewards: s
Hp
Ha
z ¯ z z1
r1
s ¯ s
1
Sa(r1) Sp(r1)
G(z)
ex ante
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in the distribution of endowments, using the rank indexing methodology as discussed 
in Section III. We saw in Section II that equilibrium behavior depends on the reward 
function S which is jointly determined by G and H. Thus, as the distribution of endow-
ments G or the distribution of rewards H change, so does the reward function S. Thus, a 
change in either distribution of endowments or rewards (or both) translates into a change 
in equilibrium choice of performance x(r) and, thus, into a change in individual welfare.
Equilibrium utility in terms of rank will be U(r) = U(x(r), Z(r)	−	x(r), S(r)). By 
the envelope theorem we have
(8)    U′(r)  =     
Uy(x(r), Z(r)	−	x(r), S(r))
	 	 	 __	 	
g(Z(r))
	 	 	 .
Note that as average utility is   ∫    
     U(r)	 	 dr, if individual welfare U(r) rises at every rank 
then social welfare will surely rise.
In what follows, we assume that there is a change in either the distributions of 
endowments or in the distributions of rewards, but not both. In doing this, we make 
use of the dispersion order, which as the name suggests, is a way of ordering distri-
butions in terms of their dispersion. Please see Appendix A for details. Our results 
with respect to inequality of endowments are a generalization of those in Hopkins 
and Kornienko (2009).
A. Change in Endowments (Regime G)
In this section, we investigate the effects of changes in the distribution of endow-
ments on equilibrium performance decisions and equilibrium utility. In particular, 
we find that a decrease in the inequality of endowments can have adverse effects. 
This is because as peoples’ endowments become closer together, it is easier to over-
take one’s neighbors. This leads to a general increase in social competition. While 
redistribution can benefit those who receive higher endowments, even some of these 
will be worse off as a consequence of greater competition.
In regime G, we assume that the societies have identical distributions of rewards, 
i.e., Ha = Hp = H, but differ in the distributions of endowments, i.e., Ga	≠	Gp, and, 
in fact, are distinct, that is, equal at only a finite number of points. Different endow-
ments imply that the two societies have different endowment functions, i.e., Za 
=   G    a   
−1  (r) and Zp =   G    p   
−1  (r).
Our first result is to show that if a range of contestants receive an increase in 
endowments, they will respond with higher performance.
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that endowments are higher ex post so that Zp(r) ≥ 
Za(r) on an interval [0,   ˆ     r    ], where    ˆ     r     is the point of first crossing of Zp(r) and Za(r). 
Then xp(0) ≥ xa(0) and ex post performance is higher on that interval: xp(r)	>	xa(r) 
on (0,    ˆ     r    ].
As  a  consequence,  if  the  new  distribution  of  endowments  Gp  stochastically 
dominates the old, then performance will be higher for all agents. Note that if Gp 
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implies that Zp(r) ≥ Za(r) for all r	∈	[0, 1]. That is, in a richer society, where endow-
ments are higher for every agent, performance is higher for all.
COROLLARY 1: Suppose that endowments are stochastically higher ex post so that 
Zp(r) ≥ Za(r) for all r	∈	[0, 1], then performance rises almost everywhere: xp(r)	>	
xa(r) on (0, 1].
We can now give a sufficient condition for equilibrium utility to rise for all agents 
and hence for an increase in social welfare. The condition has two parts. First, 
endowments must be more dispersed in the sense of the dispersion order, or Gp ≥d Ga
(see Appendix A for the definition and properties of this and subsequently used 
stochastic orders). Second, the lowest ranked agent must be no worse off, or Zp(0) 
≥ Za(0). The point is that, as utility both depends on endowments and the degree 
of social competition, one can guarantee an increase in endowments will lead to an 
increase in utility if at the same time the social density does not rise.
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose endowments are more dispersed ex post Gp ≥d Ga and 
minimum endowments no lower Zp(0) ≥ Za(0), then utility is higher ex post almost 
everywhere: Up(r)	>	Ua(r) on (0,1].
Our final result in Section IIIA concerns a decrease in inequality. As remarked, 
there are two resulting effects. Figure 1 illustrates the direct effect. With a less 
unequal distribution of endowments, the low ranked have higher endowments ex 
post. However, as we have argued, the marginal effect works toward greater com-
petition. As people are closer together, it is easier to overtake one’s neighbors. For 
the low ranked, the direct effect dominates. For the middle class, the marginal effect 
is more important, whereas for the upper classes, they lose both from redistribution 
and from greater competition. We thus find that the middle and upper classes are 
worse off. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
Specifically, we suppose the distribution of endowments becomes less dispersed 
in terms of the dispersion order. Furthermore, the lowest ranked agent has more 
endowments, or Zp(0)	>	Za(0), and the highest ranked has less Zp(1) < Za(1). Thus, 
in a clear sense the distribution Gp of endowments is less unequal than distribution 
Ga.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that the minimum level of endowments is higher ex post
(9)    Zp(0)	>	Za(0),
and endowments are less dispersed ex post
(10)    gp(Zp(r))  ≥  ga(Za(r))  for all r	∈	(0, 1)  ⇔  Ga ≥d  Gp,
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(11)    Zp(1)  <  Za(1).
Then, performance is higher ex post for the bottom and middle: xp(r)	>	xa(r) on [0,    ˆ     r    ],
where    ˆ     r     is the only point of crossing of Za(r) and Zp(r). Second, utility rises at the 
bottom, Up(0)	>	Ua(0), but utility is lower ex post for the middle and top, Up(r) < 
Ua(r) for all r	∈	[	 	ˆ     r    , 1].
Note that this result implies that there are middle ranking agents who are worse 
off even though they have higher endowments ex post (again, see Figure 4 for the 
outcomes for individuals just to the left of    ˆ     r    ). However, the effect at the relatively 
low-ranked individuals, i.e., those with r	∈	(0,    ˆ     r    ) is, in general, ambiguous.
B. Changes in Rewards (Regime H)
Here, we show that the effects of changes in rewards are quite different from 
those arising from changes in endowments. The first point is that the effect of a 
decrease in inequality in rewards has the opposite incentive effect to a decrease in 
inequality of endowments. Lower inequality of rewards implies that the marginal 
return to greater effort is relatively low, and will tend to reduce competition. This 
will tend to make competitors better off. However, for high-ranking competitors 
who expect high rewards, the effect is ambiguous. In a less unequal society, they 
work less hard, but obtain lower rewards.
In regime H, we assume that the societies have identical distributions of endow-
ments, i.e., Ga = Gp = G, but differ in the distributions of rewards, i.e., Ha	≠	Hp and 
in fact are distinct, that is, equal at only a finite number of points. Again, different 
rewards imply that the two societies also have different reward functions, i.e., Sa(r) 
=   H    a   
−1  (r) and Sp(r) =   H    p   
−1  (r).
Figure 4
Notes: Less unequal endowments, indexing by rank: typical comparative statics when ex post endowments Zp are 
less unequal than ex ante Za. Performance rises at lower and middle ranks, but utility falls at middle and upper ranks.
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Our first result concerns sufficient conditions for greater effort by all competitors. 
We find that if rewards are lower at every rank and the rewards are more dispersed, 
then the environment is definitely more competitive and effort rises at every rank.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that the rewards are more dispersed ex post
(12)    S′ p(r)  ≥  S′ a(r) on (0, 1)	⇔	hp(Sp(r))	≤	ha(Sa(r)) on (0, 1)	⇔	Hp  ≥d	Ha,
and that the minimum reward is lower ex post
(13)    Sp(0)  <  Sa(0),
and then performance is higher ex post, so that xp(r)	>	xa(r) on (0,    ˆ     r    ], where    ˆ     r     is the 
first crossing point of Sp(r) and Sa(r).
This leads to the following corollary. If rewards are more unequal and lower at every 
rank, then performance increases for every agent.
COROLLARY 2: Suppose that the ex post rewards are more dispersed and also are 
stochastically lower, i.e., Hp ≥d	Ha and Sp(r)	≤	Sa(r) for all r	∈	[0, 1], then perfor-
mance rises almost everywhere, xp(r)	>	xa(r) on (0, 1].
Note that if one makes stronger assumptions on the utility function, one can still 
obtain an increase in performance at all ranks without the stochastic dominance 
assumption of Corollary 2. First, we look at the case of utility being additively sepa-
rable in rewards.
PROPOSITION 6: Assume utility is additively separable in rewards, that is U 
= V(x, y) + s for some function V such that conditions (i) to (v) on U are still satis-
fied, then if Hp ≥d	Ha, it follows that xp(r)	>	xa(r) almost everywhere on [0, 1].
We can obtain a similar result if utility is multiplicatively separable in rewards. 
For such preference specification, we will use another method of comparing distri-
butions, the star order. This order is defined and discussed in detail in Appendix A. 
Informally, the star order implies that Hp is more dispersed or stochastically lower 
than Ha, but not necessarily both. Compare the next result to Corollary 2, where we 
assumed that Hp is both more dispersed and stochastically lower than Ha.
PROPOSITION 7: If rewards are multiplicatively separable or U = V (x, y)s for 
some function V, such that conditions (i) to (v) on U are still satisfied, then if, Hp is 
more dispersed in the star order, than Ha, or Hp ≥*	Ha, it follows that xp(r)	>	xa(r) 
almost everywhere on [0, 1].
We next identify a sufficient condition for an increase in equilibrium utility at 
every rank. This is much simpler than when considering changes in the distribution 
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dominates the old Ha and that the lowest reward Sp(0) is strictly higher. This implies 
that Sp(r) ≥ Sa(r) for all r, or rewards are higher at every rank. As this will also 
decrease the incentives to compete, it is not surprising that equilibrium utility rises.
PROPOSITION 8: If the minimum reward is higher ex post Sp(0)	 >	 Sa(0) and 
rewards are everywhere else no lower, Sp(r) ≥ Sa(r) for all r	∈	(0, 1], then utility is 
everywhere higher ex post: Up(r)	>	Ua(r) on [0, 1].
We now turn to inequality. As illustrated in Figure 3, the direct effect of lower 
inequality in rewards benefits the low-ranked simply because their rewards will typi-
cally be higher. Furthermore, the compression of rewards will decrease the marginal 
incentive to compete and performance will fall. Thus, this marginal effect will fur-
ther benefit contestants. Thus, as we see in Figure 5, utility will rise even for the 
agent with rank    ˆ     r     whose reward is unchanged.
PROPOSITION 9: Suppose that the lowest reward is higher ex post
(14)    Sp(0)	>	Sa(0),
and also rewards are less dispersed ex post
(15)      S    p    ′		 (r)	≤	  S    a    ′		 (r) for all r	∈	(0, 1)	⇔	Ha ≥d	Hp,
and also suppose that the highest reward is lower ex post
(16)    Sp(1)  <  Sa(1).
Then performance is lower ex post xp(r) < xa(r) on (0,    ˆ     r     ], where    ˆ     r     is the only point 
of crossing of Sa(r) and Sp(r). Second, utility is higher on that interval: Up(r)	>	
Ua(r) for all r	∈	[0,    ˆ     r     ].
We have already seen, Propositions 6 and 7, that in some special cases, a reduction 
in the dispersion of rewards is sufficient to make performance fall for all competi-
tors. We give an example of this, which has another interesting property.
ExAMPLE 1: Assume that U(x, y, s) = x
α	ys for some α < 1, so rewards are multi-
plicatively separable, and that endowments are uniform on [1, 2]. Suppose, for exam-
ple, rewards go from being uniform on [0.5, 2.5] (Ha = 0.5s −	0.25 or Sa = 2r + 
0.5) to being uniform on [1, 2] (Hp = s−1 or Sp = r + 1). Then, by Proposition 7,
performance must fall almost everywhere as these two distributions satisfy Hp ≤*	Ha,
the ex post distribution is less dispersed in terms of the star order (and, also, the dis-
persion order). Note that the lowest competitor would have a higher utility under the 
ex post distribution, i.e., Up(0)	>	Ua(0), as she has a higher reward (but the same 
endowment). Indeed, everyone with rank up to 0.5 must be better off by Proposition 
9 as here the crossing point of Sa and Sp is 0.5. But, further, here U′(r) = x
α(r)Z′(r)
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not large, the slope of utility in rank will not be very different ex post. Thus, for exam-
ple, for α < 0.35, everyone will be better off under the less dispersed distribution Hp.
That is, by making rewards less dispersed, it is possible to reduce total performance 
but make a Pareto improvement. Everyone will be happier because everyone works 
less. This raises the question as to whether it would be possible to make everyone 
better off by altering the level of inequality of endowments. However, while a greater 
dispersion of endowments by Proposition 4 reduces performance for most (and possi-
bly all) competitors, it cannot make all better off for a fixed average endowment. This 
is because the greater dispersion would lower the utility of lowranked competitors, as 
they would have lower endowments in the more dispersed distribution.
V.  Results under Indexing by Level of Endowment
We now consider a situation where the endowment is intrinsic to the agent, for 
example,  talent. We,  therefore,  use  the  level-indexing  method  and  compare  an 
agent’s utility before and after changes in the level of inequality given this fixed 
level of endowment. As this method has been used before, for example, by Hopkins 
and Kornienko (2004) and Hopkins (2005), it thus requires less extensive coverage. 
We find an apparently different outcome from that under rank indexing as those with 
low endowments are now worse off under lower inequality of endowments. The rea-
son for this is that, as discussed in Section II, the direct effect of lower inequality on 
an individual on a fixed low level of endowments is negative, as opposed to positive 
under rank indexing.
We now look at the tournament from the perspective of indexing by levels of 
endowments. That is, we consider the model introduced in Section II in terms of 
endowments z not rank r. As before a continuum of contestants choose x to maximize 
utility (1). Given the assortative assignment of rewards (2), we can now write the 
equilibrium reward as a function of endowment as S(z) = H
−1(G(z)). We look for a 
Figure 5
Notes: Less unequal rewards, indexing by rank: typical comparative statics when ex post rewards Sp are less unequal 
than ex ante Sa. Performance falls and utility rises at low and middle ranks.
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strictly increasing symmetric equilibrium strategy as a function of endowments. The 
equilibrium strategy x(z) will be a solution to the following differential equation, 
compare equation (5),
(17)       
dx(z)
	 _	
dz
      =     
Us(x, z  −	x, S(z))g(z)
	 	 	 ____	 	 	 	 	
Uy(x, z  −	x, S(z)	−	Ux(x, z  −	x, S(z))h(S(z))
		 	
	 =     
dx(r)
	 _	
dr
    	 	 	dr  _	
dz
   	=     
dx(r)
	 _	
dr
    g(z).
The boundary condition will be x(	 _	 z  ) = xc(G(	 _	 z  )), that is the same as in rank terms (7). 
The only separating equilibrium in terms of endowments x(z) will be a solution to 
the above equation. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 1. Working in terms 
of endowments or ranks does not change the underlying game or its equilibria. We 
emphasize that they are just different ways of looking at the same behavior.
We will also look at individual welfare in terms of endowments. Define U(z) 
= U(x(z), z −	x(z), S(z)), that is U(z) is equilibrium utility in terms of endowments z. 
We show that a decrease in inequality of endowments amongst competitors reduces 
the utility of the weakest competitors. In contrast, a similar decrease in the disper-
sion of the rewards has an opposite effect. In contrast to our work using rank-index-
ing, we assume here that Ga and Gp have the same support [	 	 _	 z  ,  
_
	 z     ] and that similarly 
there is a common support [   _  s  ,  
_
	 s    	 ] for the distributions of rewards Ha and Hp. Here, we 
use second order stochastic dominance to order distributions in terms of dispersion 
(see Appendix A for the relationship among different stochastic orders).
PROPOSITION 10: Let Ua(z) and Up(z) be the equilibrium utilities in terms of 
endowments ex ante and ex post, respectively.
	 (i)  Suppose that Gp second order stochastically dominates Ga. Denote the first 
crossing of Ga(z) and Gp(z) as    ˆ     z    . Then, utility falls for the bottom and middle 
Up(z)	≤	Ua (z) for all z	∈	[	 	 _	 z  ,    ˆ     z    ].
	 (ii)  Suppose  that  Hp  second  order  stochastically  dominates  Ha.  Denote  the 
first crossing of Ha(s) and Hp(s) as    ˆ     s    , and denote    ˆ     z     = S
−1(	 	ˆ     s    ) = G
−1(Hp(	 	ˆ     s    )) 
= G
−1(Ha(	 	ˆ     s    )). Then, utility rises for the bottom and middle Up(z) ≥ Ua(z) for 
all z	∈	[	 	 _	 z  ,    ˆ     z    ].
That is, for those whose endowments are relatively low (e.g., less than    ˆ     z     in Figure 
6), a less unequal distribution of endowments leads to lower individual welfare, while, 
conversely, a similar decrease in inequality of rewards results in an increase in indi-
vidual welfare. This is because, as discussed in Section II, for an individual with a 
fixed low level of endowment, the direct effect of lower inequality is negative, in that 
she will now have a lower reward (again see Figure 2). This is because with the reduc-
tion in inequality there are more contestants with middling endowments who will now 
take the middling rewards. The incentive to compete is also increased by the greater 
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harder. Conversely, the direct effect of less unequal rewards is positive and incentives 
to   compete are reduced. Thus, the results for reduced inequality of rewards for level 
indexing are qualitatively similar to those for rank indexing depicted in Figure 5.
VI.  Discussion and Conclusions
This paper introduces a new distinction between different kinds of inequality. 
Inequality of initial endowments and inequality of the final rewards to success in 
society  have  opposing  effects.  Greater  inequality  of  endowments  decreases  the 
degree of social competition, greater inequality of rewards increases it. Thus, it is 
not the case that greater inequality necessarily decreases happiness. Rather, it is 
inequality of rewards, not of endowments, that is a likely cause of concern.
There has been much recent work concerned with the possibility that people 
have intrinsic preferences over the level of inequality. Here, we offer a reason why 
inequality may matter even without any concern for social justice and in the absence 
of such social preferences. This is because when there is interpersonal competition 
for employment and educational opportunities, inequality has a direct impact on 
incentives and, hence, equilibrium effort and equilibrium utility. The competitive 
threat of being excluded from desirable opportunities means that, in equilibrium, 
everyone works too hard. This means that people can be made better off by a change 
in incentives implicit in the two different forms of inequality. The majority can gain 
from a more dispersed distribution of endowments or from a less dispersed dis-
tribution of rewards. In fact, we can construct examples where a reduction in the 
inequality of rewards makes everyone better off, that is, it is Pareto improving, even 
though this reduction in incentives decreases total performance.
Figure 6
Notes: Less unequal endowments, indexing by levels: typical comparative statics when the ex post distribution of 
endowments Gp is less unequal than ex ante Ga. Utility falls at low and middle levels of endowments.
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It is true that if contestants’ efforts benefit other agents, such as partners, employers 
or members of future generations, then there is a stronger case for reward inequality. 
However, there remains a question as to whether those who lose from such inequal-
ity are ever compensated. For example, gains to future generations may not be suf-
ficient recompense to those who lose now from greater inequality of rewards. Or, 
as another possibility, societies with high inequality of rewards may have higher 
growth, but lower happiness, for a given level of per capita income than societies 
with lesser inequality of rewards. Thus, one clear direction for further research is 
to use the current model as the stage game in a dynamic setting. Preliminary results 
in this direction indicate that the effects of changes in inequality on growth depend 
heavily on whether current performance determines the rewards or the endowments 
of the next generation.
As we demonstrated in this paper, the relationship between inequality and indi-
vidual welfare can be less straightforward than is commonly thought. The gains 
and losses to greater inequality even differ according to the viewpoint taken, that 
is, whether we compare at a constant level of endowment or at a constant rank in 
society. However, rather than being a setback, we believe the richness of the rela-
tionships we have outlined and the tools we have developed to analyze them offer 
many possibilities for greater understanding of social phenomena.
For example, one of the more recent reasons advanced for the desirability of greater 
income equality is the presence of relative concerns. It has been argued that in countries 
where gross poverty has been eliminated, health tends to be driven by stress caused 
by one’s relative position, which, in turn, is exacerbated by inequalities. The most 
famous single case study is that of British civil servants, where health was found to be 
very strongly positively correlated with a civil servant’s rank in the service (Marmot 
et al. 1991). It has been argued by several authors, notably Frank (1999, 2000), that if 
utility does depend on relative position, greater equality should be socially beneficial. 
However, Angus Deaton (2003) argues that the empirical evidence as a whole does not 
support a general link between inequality and ill health. Furthermore, it has been diffi-
cult to establish whether there is a positive or negative relationship between inequality 
and self-reported happiness or life-satisfaction (Alberto Alesina, Rafael di Tella, and 
Robert MacCulloch 2004; Andrew E. Clark 2003).
This  paper  suggests  a  reason  why  this  may  be  the  case.  Even  when  utility 
depends on relative position, different types of inequality may have opposite effects. 
Therefore, empirical work that is based on measures of inequality that conflate 
rewards and endowments may obtain weak results as the two opposing effects may 
cancel. The problem in immediately applying this insight to empirical problems is 
that, to our knowledge, no distinction between reward and endowment inequality 
has traditionally been made in data collection. However, with data sources such as 
longitudinal studies becoming more widely available, it may soon be possible to 
distinguish between initial endowments and final rewards.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that, although this work approaches inequality 
outside the framework of distributive justice, it does not mean that moral considerations 
are irrelevant to the issue of inequality. In fact, precisely because existing theories 
of justice do not give interpersonal competition such a central role, our tournament 
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distributive justice. Thus, we hope that this paper, even though it takes a purely eco-
nomic approach, may aid our understanding of inequality in many of its aspects.
Appendix A: 
The Dispersive, Star, and Other Stochastic Orders
We use two different stochastic orders, the dispersive and the star orders. These 
may not be well-known in economics (though see Hoppe et al. 2009), but are 
extremely useful for the social contests we consider. Let F and G be two arbitrary 
continuous distribution functions each with support on an interval (but the two inter-
vals need not be identical or even overlap), and let F 
−1 and G 
−1 be the correspond-
ing left-continuous inverses (so that F 
−1(r) = inf{x : F(x) ≥ r}, r	∈	[0, 1] and G 
−1(r) 
= inf{x : G(x) ≥ r}, r	∈	[0, 1] ), and let f and g be the respective densities.
DEFINITION 1: (Moshe Shaked and J. George Shanthikumar (2007, 148)) A vari-
able with distribution F is said to be smaller in the dispersive order (or less dis-
persed) than a variable with a distribution G (denoted as F ≤d	G) whenever G 
−1(r)	
−	F 
−1(r) is (weakly) increasing for r	∈	(0, 1).
That is, the difference in the two variables at a given rank increases in rank. This 
has the following important consequence:
(18)    G  ≥d	F if and only if f (F 
−1(r))  ≥  g(G 
−1(r)) for all r	∈	(0, 1).
That is, for a fixed rank, the more dispersed distribution is less dense than the less dis-
persed one. Note that because the condition (18) is expressed in terms of ranks, there 
is no problem in comparing distributions with different, even nonoverlapping, sup-
ports. Finally, when both distributions have finite means, if F is less dispersed than G 
then VarF (z)	≤ VarG (z)	whenever VarG (z)	<	∞. Figure 7 shows a simple example of 
distributions which are ordered in terms of the dispersion order. The distributions   G    B   
1
   ,
   G    B   
2
   ,   G    B   
3
    all have different means but are equally dispersed, and all are more dispersed 
than GA. Figure 8 shows the importance of the dispersion order for incentives in the 
tournament model. If a distribution Ha is more dispersed than a distribution Hp, then 
by (18) necessarily the inverse function Sa(r) is steeper than Sp(r). This is because if 
S(r) = H
−1(r), then S′(r)	= 1/h(H
−1(r)).
The star order is defined as follows.
DEFINITION 2: (Shaked and Shanthikumar 2007, 214). A variable with a distribu-
tion F is smaller in the star order than a variable with a distribution G, or F ≤*G,   
if G
−1(F(z))/z increases for z ≥ 0.
Note that for two nonnegative random variables X and Y, the star and dispersive 
order have the following relationship:
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However,  if  a  distribution  F  is  more  dispersed  than  another  distribution  g,  or 
F ≥d	g, it does not imply that F is larger in the star order, F ≥* g, though it is not 
excluded. Nor does F ≥* g imply F ≥d g, nor does it rule it out.
Lemma 1: take two distributions Ha(s), Hp(s) with support on the positive real line 
and with differentiable inverses sa(r) and sp(r) respectively. then, the following holds
(20)    Hp(s)  ≥*  Ha(s) ⇔    d	 _ 
dr
	       
sp(r)
  _ 
sa(r)
    ≥ 0  ⇔    
s′ p(r)
  _ 
sp(r)
    ≥    
s′ a(r)
  _ 
sa(r)
  
for all r ∈ (0,1).
Figure 7
note: an example of the dispersion order: F ≤d	g1 ∿ d g2 ∿d	g3.
Figure 8
note: Dispersion order: If the ex post distribution is less dispersed than the ex ante or Hp ≤ Ha, then the inverse dis-
tribution function sp =   H    p   
−1  (r) is less steep than sa for all r	∈ (0,1), i.e., the marginal return to an increase in rank 
is lower.
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PROOF:
The relationship between the first and second statements follows directly from 
Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, p216 and Theorem 4.B.5). The relation between 
the second and third follows from differentiation.
Economists often use second order stochastic dominance to order distributions in 
terms of dispersion. However, there is no clear relation between the dispersive order 
and second order stochastic dominance. This is because the second order stochastic 
dominance relationship compares distributions both on the basis of the mean and dis-
persion (variance). In contrast, the dispersive order is only concerned with dispersion. 
For example, in Figure 7, distribution F second order stochastically dominates distri-
butions G1 and G2, but it is second order stochastically dominated by distribution G3.
On the other hand, since the star order implies single crossing of the distribution 
functions, for two distributions with the same mean we have that if distribution Ha is 
larger in the star order Ha ≥* Hp, then Ha second order stochastically dominates Hp 
(Shaked and Shanthikumar, 2007, 223, link the star and Lorenz order which is essen-
tially the same as second order stochastic dominance when comparing distributions 
with the same mean). The following examples demonstrate the relationship between 
the dispersion order, the star order, and the second order stochastic dominance order.
ExAMPLE 2: If Ha(s) = s, that it is uniform on [0, 1] and Hp(s) = 2s −	0.5, a uniform 
distribution on [0.25, 0.75], then Ha is more dispersed than Hp. Indeed, Sa(r)/ Sp(r) 
= r/(0.5r + 0.25) which is increasing so Ha ≥* Hp. Furthermore, Sa ′(r) = 1	>	0.5 
= S′ p(r) so that Ha ≥d Hp. And finally Hp second order stochastically dominates Ha.
This example illustrates a more substantive difference.
ExAMPLE 3: If Ha(s) = s −	2, that it is uniform on [2, 3] and Hp(s) = (s −	1)/2, a 
uniform distribution on [1, 3], then Hp is more dispersed than Ha but stochastically 
lower. The dispersive order captures the dispersion so as S′ a(r) = 1 < 2 = S′ p(r) so 
that Hp ≥d Ha. But, Sp(r)/Sa(r) = (2r + 1)/(2 + r) which is increasing so Hp ≥* Ha.
However, as Ha stochastically dominates Hp, it also second order stochastically 
dominates Hp.
Appendix B: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Mailath (1987) establishes in a general signaling model the existence and unique-
ness of a separating equilibrium under certain conditions. If the current model fits 
within Mailath’s framework, then it would follow that the unique separating equi-
librium is a solution to the differential equation (5) with boundary condition x(0) 
= xc(0) from Theorems 1 and 2 of Mailath (1987, 1353). It would also follow by 
Proposition 3 of Mailath (1987, 1362) that x(z)	>	xc(z) on (	 _	 z  ,  
_
	 z    	 ). The only sub-
stantial difference is that Mailath assumes the signaller’s utility is of the form (in 
current notation) V(r,    ˆ     r    , x), where V is a smooth utility function and    ˆ     r     is the per-
ceived type, so that in a separating equilibrium the signaler has utility V(r, r, x). 
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function V(·) such that V(r,    ˆ     r    , x) = U(x, Z(r)	−	x, S(	 	ˆ     r    )) everywhere on [0, 1]	×	[0, 1]	
×	[	 	 _	 z  ,  
_
	 z    	 ]. One can then verify that the conditions (i)−(v) imposed on U(·) imply 
conditions (1)–(5) of Mailath (1987, p1352) on V.
12 In particular, note that condi-
tion (1) is simply that V is twice differentiable, condition (2) is that V2	≠	0, here 
V2 = Us S′(r)	>	0. Condition (3) is that V13	≠	0, and here V13 = (Uxy − Uyy)Z′(r)	>	
0. Mailath’s (1987)	condition (4) requires that V3(r, r, x) = 0 has a unique solution 
in x which maximizes V(r, r, x). Here, V3 = Ux − Uy and we have assumed under 
condition (v) that there is a unique solution to the equation Ux −	Uy = 0. Since here 
V33 = Uxx	−	2Uxy + Uyy < 0, this solution is a maximum. Furthermore, since V33 is 
everywhere negative, Mailath’s condition (5) is automatically satisfied.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
First note that, given the equation (5), we have that
(21)       
  x    a    ′		 (r)
	 _	
x′ p(r)
		   =     
ϕ(Za(r), S(r), xa)
	 	 __	 	
ϕ(Zp(r), S(r), xp)
		 ,
so that any point where xa = xp, the relative slope only depends on Za and Zp, and 
thus the slopes are equal whenever Za and Zp are equal. Furthermore, given our 
assumptions, we have that
(22)       
∂ϕ(z, s, x)
	 _	
∂z
      =     
Uys(Uy	−  Ux)	−  Us(Uyy −  Uxy)
	 	 	 ___	 	
(Uy −  Ux)
2    	>  0
(by properties (iii) and (iv), it holds that Uy −	Ux	>	0 when evaluated at the equi-
librium solution as x(r)	>	xc(r)). Thus, at any point where xa(r) = xp(r), we have 
that   x    a    ′		 	>		 x    p    ′		  (so that xa is steeper than xp and thus crosses xp from below) whenever 
Za(r)	>	Zp(r) (i.e., whenever ex ante endowments exceed ex post endowments), and 
vice versa.
By the boundary condition (7), the condition Za(0)	≤	Zp(0) implies that xp(0) 
≥ xa(0) (i.e., that the poorest individual, now that she has a greater endowment, 
chooses greater performance). Given our assumption that Ga and Gp are distinct, it 
follows that Zp(r)	>	Za(r) almost everywhere on (0,    ˆ     r     ]. Thus, xp(r) can only cross 
xa(r) from below except perhaps at the finite number of points, where Zp(r) = Za(r).
We first rule out that there is an interval where xp(r)	≤	xa(r). Suppose on the con-
trary there exist at least one interval [r1, r2]	⊆ [0,    ˆ     r     ], such that xp(r)	≤	xa(r). By the 
continuity of xa and xp, it must be that xp(r1) = xa(r1). Note that
(23)       
∂ϕ(z, s, x)
	 _	
∂x
      =     
(Uxs	−	Uys)(Uy  −	Ux)	−	Us(2Uxy  −	Uxx	−	Uyy)
	 	 	 	 	 ____	 	 	
(Uy  −	Ux)
2    	< 0.
12 Mailath, in proving the intermediate result Proposition 5 (Mailath1987, 1364), also assumes that ∂V/∂   ˆ     r     is 
bounded. Here, if we assume that both Us and S′(r) are bounded (the latter requires h(s) is non-zero on its support), 
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In combination with (22), it would follow that x′ a(r) < x′ p(r) almost everywhere on 
[r1, r2 ], which combined with xa(r1) = xp(r1) is a contradiction to xp(r)	≤	xa(r) on the 
interval. Thus, xp(r)	>	xa(r) almost everywhere on [0,    ˆ     r     ].
We rule out that xp(r) = xa(r) at individual points. Since the previous argument 
excludes intervals where xp(r)	 ≤	 xa(r), equality is only possible at the isolated 
points where Zp(r) = Za(r). But at any such point    ˜     r     on (0,    ˆ     r     ], as Zp(r)	>	Za(r) almost 
everywhere, we have that gp(Zp(	 	˜     r    )) ≥ ga(Za(	 	˜     r    )) (remember that Z′(r) = 1/g(Z (r))). 
Now, note that Zp(	 	˜     r    ) = Za(	 	˜     r    ) =    ˜     z    . Next, we invoke the level-indexing approach and 
consider solutions to the game in terms of endowments z. Let S(z) = H
−1(G(z)). 
Write solutions to the differential equation (17) as xp(z) and xa(z) for the respective 
distributions of endowments. Then if xp(	 	˜     r    ) = xa(	 	˜     r    ), it must be that xp(	 	˜     z    ) = xa(	 	˜     z    ). 
As xp(r)	>	xa(r) for r in (	 	˜     r     −	ϵ,    ˜     r    ) for some ϵ	>	0, we must have xp(z)	>	xa(z) for 
endowments slightly less than    ˜     z    . Note that it must hold that   x    p    ′		 (	 	˜     r    ) =   x    a    ′		 (	 	˜     r    ), and for 
the case of gp(	 	˜     z    )	>	ga(	 	˜     z    ), it must be that x′ p(	 	˜     z    )	>	x′ a(	 	˜     z    ), so that xp(z) crosses xa(z) 
from below, which is a contradiction. This leaves us with the possibility that xp(r) = 
xa(r) in a nongeneric case of gp(Zp(	 	˜     r    )) = ga(Za(	 	˜     r    )).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
First, as endowments are (weakly) higher at r = 0, by the boundary condition 
(7), the privately optimal performance will be higher ex post xc, p(0) ≥ xc, a(0) as 
will equilibrium performance at r = 0. Thus, Up(0) ≥ Ua(0) (i.e., as the poorest 
individual has no reduction in endowments she will not be worse off). We have that
        1  _	
gp(Zp(r))
		 	=     
dZp(r)
	 _	
dr
      ≥     
dZa(r)
	 _	
dr
    	=      1  _	
ga(Z(r))
		  for all r	∈	[0, 1].
In other words, Zp(r) is (weakly) steeper than Za(r) on [0, 1], so that clearly Zp(r) ≥ 
Za(r) for r	∈	[0, 1].
Suppose that Up(0)	>	Ua(0), and suppose, in contradiction to the claim we are trying 
to prove, that Up(r) equals Ua(r) at least once on (0, 1). Denote the first such point as 
r1	∈	(0, 1). It is easy to show that, as Zp(0) ≥ Za(0) and Gp ≥d Ga, we have Zp(r)	>	
Za(r) for all r	∈	(0, 1]. Thus, by Corollary 1, xp(r)	>	xa(r) on (0, 1], and it must be that 
yp(r) < ya(r) in the neighborhood of r1. Let Ui, y(r) = Uy(xi (r), Zi (r)	−	xi (r), S(r)) for 
i = a, p. Then, as dUy = Uxy dx + Uyy dy, and, given our original assumptions on U, 
it must be that Up, y(r)	>	Ua, y	 (r) in the neighborhood of r1. Using the marginal util-
ity condition (8), combined with the fact that, given the dispersion order, g(Zp(r))	≤	
g(Za(r)), it must be that   U    p    ′		 (r)	>	U′ a (r) in the neighborhood of r1, so that Up(r) can 
only be steeper than Ua(r), and thus can only cross from below. Given Up(0)	>	Ua(0), 
we are done.
Suppose, instead, that we have that Up(0) = Ua(0). Then, the above argument 
rules out that Up can cross Ua from above, so that the claim can only fail if there is 
an interval (0,   ˜     r    ) on which Up(r)	≤	Ua(r). Then, there must exist a point r2	∈	(0,   ˜     r    ), 
such that   U    p    ′		 (r2)	≤	  U    a    ′		 (r2) and Up, y	≤	Ua, y	 . But given (8), and also that Gp ≥d	Ga, if   
U    p    ′		 (r2)	≤	  U    a    ′		 (r2), then Up, y (r2)	≤	Ua, y	 (r2), which can only happen if yp(r2) ≥ ya(r2). 
But this, combined with the fact that xp(r2)	>	xa(r2) (by Proposition 2) implies that 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
From Proposition 2, we have xp(r)	>	xa(r) on (0,    ˆ     r     ]. But note as here Zp(0)	>	
Za(0), the lowest agent has a strictly greater endowment, we have also xp(0)	>	xa(0) 
as the cooperative choice, which is the equilibrium choice of the bottom agent by 
(7), is increasing in endowments. Turning to utility, we can consider two cases. 
First, suppose that xp(r) ≥ xa(r) on [	 	ˆ     r    , 1]. Then, as endowments for individuals with 
rank (	 	ˆ     r    , 1] are strictly lower ex post than ex ante, we have necessarily yp(r) < ya(r) 
on [	 	ˆ     r    , 1]. Now, as xp(r) ≥ xa(r) and yp(r) < ya(r), then, for some    ˜     r    , we can find a pair 
(	 	˜  		 x    ,     ˜  		 y     ), such that    ˜  		 x     +    ˜  		 y     = xp + yp (that is, (	 	˜  		 x    ,    ˜  		 y     ) are feasible given exnpost endow-
ments), but xc,p <    ˜  		 x     < xp and    ˜  		 y     = ya. But then, U(xp(r), yp(r), S(r)) < U(	 	˜  		 x    ,    ˜  		 y    , S(r)) < 
U(xa(r), ya(r), S(r)), and the result follows.
Suppose instead that xp(r) < xa(r) for some r in (r1, r2) with r1	>		 	ˆ     r    . If yp (r)	≤	
ya(r) on that interval, it is clear that Up(r) < Ua(r), and we are done. Suppose instead 
that yp(r)	>	ya(r) on some interval (r3, r4) with r4	≤	r2 (as endowments are lower ex 
post for r	>		 	ˆ     r    , it must be that r3	>	r1 ). We want to rule out the possibility of Up(r) 
≥ Ua(r) somewhere on this interval. Now, it must be the case that Up(r3) < Ua(r3) as 
xp(r3) < xa(r3) and yp (r3) = ya(r3). We have gp(r) ≥ ga(r) everywhere. Furthermore, 
dUy = Uxy dx + Uyy dy. Given that x decreases and y increases ex post on (r3, r4) and 
our original assumptions on U, it can be calculated that, given (8), that U′ p(r) < 
U′ a(r) on this interval. Combined with Up(r3) < Ua(r3), the result follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
First, given the boundary condition (7), we have x(0) = xc(0). Note that applying 
property (v) to the definition of xc(r) in (6), we have ∂xc/∂s ≤	0, so that given Sp(0) 
< Sa(0), it follows that xp(0) ≥ xa(0). Almost everywhere on [0,    ˆ     r     ), we have both 
Sa(r)	>	Sp(r) and S′ p(r)	>	S′ a(r). Note that
(24)       
∂ϕ(z, s, x)
	 _	
∂s
      =     
Uss(Uy  −	Ux)	−	Us(Uys  −	Uxs)
	 	 	 ___	 	
(Uy  −	Ux)
2    	≤	0.
It immediately follows that if xa(r) = xp(r) anywhere on [0,    ˆ     r    ), then x′ a(r)	>	x′ p(r). 
So, there can only be one crossing of xa(r) and xp(r) on that interval, and xp(r) must 
cut xa(r) from below. Thus, the only way for the claim to be false is if xp(r)	≤	xa(r) 
on some interval [0, r1 ]. But then, as ∂ϕ(z, s, x)/∂x < 0 by (23), and ∂ϕ(z, s, x)/∂s 
≤	0 by (24), and as Sp(r) < Sa(r) and S′ p(r)	>	S′ a(r), it follows that x′ p(r)	>	x′ a(r) on 
[0, r1], which is a contradiction.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Given additively separable utility, we have xp(0) = xa(0) = xc(0) as with sepa-
rable utility the cooperative choice does not depend on S(0). The differential equa-
tion (5) is now
(25)    x′(r)  =     
S′(r)
	 	 ___	 	 	 	
Vy(x, Z(r)	−	x)	−	Vx(x, Z(r)	−	x)
		 .
Given the dispersion order, we have S′ p(r) ≥ S′ a(r) for all r and the result is easy to 
establish using the arguments in the proof of the previous proposition.VoL. 2 No. 3  135 HoPKINS AND KoRNIENKo: WHICH INEQUALITY?
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
As with additive separable utility, we have xp(0) = xa(0) irrespective of Sa(0) or 
Sp(0). The differential equation is now
    x′(r)  =     
S′(r)
	 _	
S(r)
		 	 	 	 	
V(x, Z(r)	−	x)
	 	 	 ___	 	 	 	
Vy (x, Z(r)	−	x)	−	Vx (x, Z(r)	−	x)
		 .
Now,  by  Lemma  1  in Appendix A,  by  the  star  order,  we  have  S′ p(r)/Sp(r)  ≥ 
S′ a(r)/Sa(r) for all r. The proof, again, then follows that of Proposition 5.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8:
Given the lowest reward S(0) is higher ex post, we have Up(0)	>	Ua(0). We 
divide [0, 1] into two sets. Let I1 consist of points where xp(r) ≥ xa(r) and I2 consist 
of points where xp(r) < xa(r). Considering I2, as rewards are higher and effort lower, 
clearly Up(r)	>	Ua(r) on I2. Turning to I1, here xp(r) ≥ xa(r) and hence yp(r)	≤	ya(r). 
Now, as U′(r) = Uy S(r)/g(Z(r)) and dUy = Uxy dx + Uyy dy, we have U′ p(r)	>	U′ a(r) 
almost everywhere on I1. The result follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9:
We have Sa(r) < Sp(r) and S′ p(r) < S′ a(r) on [0,    ˆ     r    ). Thus, by reversing Proposition 
5, we have xa(r)	>	xp(r) on (0,    ˆ     r     ]. Furthermore, given that    ˆ     r     is the first point of 
crossing, we have Sa(r) < Sp(r) on [0,    ˆ     r     ). It is clear that, as performance is strictly 
lower and rewards are higher under distribution Hp(s), it follows that Up(r)	>	Ua(r).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 10:
We have by the envelope theorem U′(z) = Uy(x(z), z −	 x(z), S(z)). First, we 
look at (i). Suppose the claim is false, and there exists at least one interval on 
(	 _	 z  ,    ˆ     z     ], where Up(z)	>	Ua(z). Let us denote the set of points as IU = {z ≤	   ˆ     z     : Up(z)	
>	Ua(z)} (possibly disjoint), and let z1 = inf IU ≥   _  z  . We can find a z2	∈	IU, such that 
Up(z)	>	Ua(z) for all z in (z1, z2]. Note that since, by the common boundary condi-
tion, Up(	 _	 z  ) = Ua(	 _	 z  ). As Gp(z)	≤	Ga(z), then Sp(z)	≤	Sa(z) for all z	∈	IU. As rewards 
are lower, for Up(z)	>	Ua(z) to be possible, it must be the case that xA(z) < xB(z) for all 
z	∈	IU. But then as U′ is increasing in x(z), and strictly increasing in S(z), we have U′ p(z)	
≤	U′ a(z) on IU. This, together with Up(z1) = Ua(z1), implies Up(z)	≤	Ua(z) for all z	∈	
(z1, z2], which is a contradiction. Part (ii) can be established by an identical argument.
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